Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and the Problem of Violence

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6283293
AutoresJakub Zielinski (0000-0001-8935-8137, University of Chicago, autor de correspondencia)
Año1999
Volumen43
Número2
Páginas213-228
Fecha de publicación1999-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002799043002006
OpenAlexW2117644508
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas11

This article asks why some attempts at democratization trigger a military intervention while others end peacefully. The author argues that the cause of violence lies in a miscommunication within the government rather than in an intransigence of the opposition. A formal model is analyzed in which opposition, reformers, and military bargain over the extent of democratization. The reformers are better informed than the opposition about the military's attitude toward reforms. Consequently, the opposition treats the behavior of the reformers as a signal about the military. In this model, violence occurs only when the reformers are misinformed about the military. The author tests this result against historical evidence from Hungary and Poland. In 1956, both countries attempted to liberalize their dictatorships. Yet, Soviet military intervention occurred only in Hungary. The author traces the difference in the outcomes to different inferences drawn in the two countries about the Soviet attitude toward reform

Authoritarianism · Democracy · Democratization · Dictatorship · Military rule · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Balkans: History, Politics, Society · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · Law · Political Conflict and Governance