Bargaining Outcomes as the Result of Coordinated Expectations

An Experimental Study Of Sequential Bargaining

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6283475
AutoresJohn P Carpenter (0000-0002-9228-3962, Middlebury College), Jeffrey P Carpenter (0000-0003-0969-5876, Middlebury College, autor de correspondencia)
Año2003
Volumen47
Número2
Páginas119-139
Fecha de publicación2003-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002702251023
OpenAlexW2026106027
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas16

Experimental studies of two-person sequential bargaining demonstrate that the concept of subgame perfection is not a reliable predictor of actual behavior. Alternative explanations argue that fairness influences outcomes and that bargainer expectations matter and are likely not to be coordinated at the outset. This study examines the process by which bargainers in dyads coordinate their expectations on a bargaining convention and how this convention is supported by the seemingly empty threat of rejecting positive but small subgame perfect offers. To organize the data from this experiment, a Markov model of adaptive expectations and bounded rationality is developed. The model predicts actual behavior quite closely

Adaptive expectations · Bounded rationality · Convention · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Markov chain · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Perfection · Political science · Process (computing · Rational expectations · Rationality · Repeated game · Subgame · Subgame perfect equilibrium · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology