Stability and Alliance Cohesion

The Effects of Strategic Arms Reductions on Targeting and Extended Deterrence

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6283500
AutoresFred Chernoff (0000-0001-9450-4821, Colgate University, autor de correspondencia)
Año1990
Volumen34
Número1
Páginas92-101
Fecha de publicación1990-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002790034001005
OpenAlexW2044375030
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas12

There are differences between what the United States says and does with regard to strategic arms. There are also differences between policies that are ideal from a uniquely U.S. perspective and from a broader alliance perspective. These two sets of differences correspond to one another; the latter help to explain the former. Furthermore, recent discussions of arms reduction options, such as Nalebuff (1988), fail to consider the differences between national and alliance points of view. Arguments for minimal deterrence do not account for the damaging effects on alliance relations. A clear understanding of the different perspectives, which consequently pull U.S. policy in different directions, is necessary to see the genuine merits of various options under discussion for future agreements. American alliance commitments help to explain the divergence

Alliance · Cohesion (chemistry · Deterrence theory · Divergence (linguistics · Economics · Ideal (ethics · Law and economics · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Computer Science · Law · Philosophy · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics