Resource Allocations and Disapproval Voting in Unequal Groups
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6283676 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ben D’exelle (University of East Anglia), Arno Riedl (0000-0002-4612-6739, CESifo, Poschingerstr, Munich, Germany, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2013 |
| Volumen | 57 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 627-652 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2013-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002712448912 |
| OpenAlex | W2078298602 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 36 |
Resources are often allocated in groups through decentralized nonmarket mechanisms. We experimentally investigate groups where a rich representative allocates resources among poorer members, who can announce disapproval by voting for a measure hurting the representative. We examine the effect of inequality aversion by keeping information on the allocation private in one and commonly known in another condition. Further, we investigate whether casting votes publicly or secretly influences allocation and voting behavior. We find that disapproval rates are highest with secret voting or a commonly known resource allocation. Disapproval voting fails to stimulate representatives to appear more prosocial, but rather induces them to keep everything. Private information on the allocation and public voting leads to least disapproval and exclusion of the poorest group members from the resources. The analysis shows that inequality aversion of poorer group members crucially interacts with the investigated institutional and informational details of the resource allocation situation
Computer security · Economics · Inequality · Inequity aversion · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Private information retrieval · Prosocial behavior · Public economics · Resource (disambiguation · Resource allocation · Voting · Voting behavior · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Community-Based and -Driven Development
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Equilibrium points in n -person games
Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Do local officials know something we don’t? Decentralization of targeted transfers in Albania
Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Z-Tree
Erc
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Excluded Again
The Donor Problem
Targeted Transfers in Poor Countries
Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets
The Risk of Resource Misappropriation in Community-Driven Development
Bargaining Outside the Lab – A Newspaper Experiment of a Three‐Person Ultimatum Game
Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Covenants with and without a Sword
Bargaining in Legislatures
Bargaining in Legislatures
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,25 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2018 - 2019 (2) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |