War and Default

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6284168
AutoresPatrick E Shea (0000-0002-5051-4443, University of Houston, autor de correspondencia), Paul Poast (0000-0001-8930-2758, University of Chicago)
Año2018
Volumen62
Número9
Páginas1876-1904
Fecha de publicación2018-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002717707239
OpenAlexW2620766876
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas17
Referencias citadas61

Sovereign borrowing is often used to cover the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war’s economic disruptions, strains states’ ability to honor debt promises. Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this article lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states likely to default are unable to acquire the financing necessary to fight a war. In sum, states that lack the financial means to adequately borrow avoid paths to war. After offering some examples of the selection mechanism at work, we present evidence that states unlikely to default will avoid entering the war sample. Our findings have implications for the inferences researchers make about war finance and war onset

Argument (complex analysis · Debt · Default · Economics · Honor · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sample (material · Selection (genetic algorithm · Sovereign debt · Sovereign default · Sovereignty · Spanish Civil War · World War II · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Finance · Law · Natural Resources and Economic Development · State Capitalism and Financial Governance