Knowing Your Enemy

Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6284648
AutoresShanna A Kirschner (Allegheny College, Meadville, PA, USA,), Shanna Kirschner (0000-0002-1261-4398, Allegheny College, autor de correspondencia)
Año2010
Volumen54
Número5
Páginas745-770
Fecha de publicación2010-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002710372753
OpenAlexW2143220386
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas15
Referencias citadas56

When do civil wars last especially long? Commitment problems can stymie conflict resolution but they are not homogeneous across all civil wars. Indeed, combatants’ perceptions of their adversaries significantly affect the severity of commitment problems. Intergroup interactions provide combatants with one crucial type of information about their adversaries and about the risks associated with signing a peace settlement, shaping strategic decisions. The argument is tested against a new data set of all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The results demonstrate that intergroup interactions prolong wars when they indicate that a peace deal will be especially fragile or that the costs of it breaking down will be especially high. This is true, regardless of the combatants’ goals or their capabilities. In sum, information shapes perceptions and the severity of commitment problems, in turn affecting the duration of civil wars

Adversary · Argument (complex analysis · Civil Conflict · Computer security · Conflict resolution · Economics · Ethnic group · Law and economics · Perception · Political economy · Political science · Set (abstract data type · Settlement (finance · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence