Signaling under the Security Dilemma

An Experimental Analysis

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6285296
AutoresBrandon K Yoder (0000-0001-8815-8854, Australian National University, autor de correspondencia), Kyle Haynes (0000-0002-2713-6827, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA)
Año2021
Volumen65
Número4
Páginas672-700
Fecha de publicación2021-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002720968261
OpenAlexW3097504483
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9
Referencias citadas51

One of the most intractable debates in IR revolves around the severity and frequency of the security dilemma. Offensive realists argue that states are compelled to make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions, which yields inexorable competition and conflict even between mutually-benign actors. Yet others have argued that rational benign states should always be able to find cooperative signals that are costly enough to be credible, but not too costly to risk sending. If true, this should alleviate the security dilemma and facilitate cooperation, even under high initial distrust. However, there is little empirical work on interstate reassurance and the conditions under which mutually-benign actors can build trust. We address this gap using laboratory experiments to test Andrew Kydd’s canonical model of the security dilemma. We find strong support for the directional effects of the hypothesized signaling mechanisms. However, the frequency of cooperation is significantly lower than the model predicts, and the feasibility of reassurance is highly sensitive to the degree of prior trust. This implies that although reassurance can mitigate the security dilemma, offensive realism may still capture important psychological mechanisms that impede interstate cooperation

Competition (biology · Computer security · Dilemma · Distrust · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Offensive · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Prisoner's dilemma · Realism · Security Dilemma · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Psychology · Social Psychology