Unraveling Secessions

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6285851
AutoresFriedhelm Hentschel (0000-0001-5985-5589, SIAW-HSG, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen63
Número6
Páginas1517-1541
Fecha de publicación2019-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002718792611
OpenAlexW4240643943
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas52

In many ethnically segregated countries, policy is directly linked to ethnicity, and thus, nonruling ethnic groups may suffer from the implemented policy. For these groups, a secession is one instrument to eliminate ethnic heterogeneity costs by implementing their own policy. However, leaving the country reduces economies of scale in the public good provision. Therefore, separatist ethnic groups face a trade-off between eliminating ethnic heterogeneity costs and losing economies of scale in the provision of public goods. I present a model for unraveling secessions in an ethnically segregated country. I use this model to derive conditions for the breakup of countries and to compare equilibrium behavior with and without the possibility of a consecutive secession. Among others, I find that a secessionist conflict will be more likely if there is a previous secession. Furthermore, aggregated conflict spending is larger in secessions with the possibility of a consecutive conflict

Demographic economics · Development economics · Economics · Economies of scale · Ethnic conflict · Ethnic group · Ethnically diverse · Geography · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public good · Scale (ratio · Secession · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Taxation and Compliance Studies