Transnational Terrorism
Externalities and Coalition Formation
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6285883 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Andre Rossi De Oliveira (0000-0002-2979-4698, Utah Valley University, autor de correspondencia), João Ricardo Faria (IPED, University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX, USA), Jo Ão Ricardo Faria (0000-0001-6484-3566, The University of Texas at El Paso), Emilson C D Silva (University of Alberta), Emilson Silva (0000-0003-0230-9485, University of Alberta) |
| Año | 2018 |
| Volumen | 62 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 496-528 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2018-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002716660586 |
| OpenAlex | W2477990621 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
| Referencias citadas | 29 |
We investigate how externalities and cooperation affect nations’ efforts to counter transnational terrorism activities. Our model captures three factors whose interplay determines counterterrorism (CT) efforts and terrorist activity: the size of the spillover effect, the degree of internalization of the externality, and whether nations’ CT efforts have an asymmetric or symmetric effect on the security of other nations. In our symmetric model, preemptive CT efforts and terrorist activities decrease with the size of the externality regardless of the degree of cooperation between nations. In our asymmetric model, as the externality of the “smaller” nation increases, the “larger” nations reduce their efforts, and the smaller nation reacts by increasing its own efforts. We also investigate coalition stability and show that (a) in the preemptive case, the full coalition is not stable and partial coalitions are stable for sufficiently small externalities; and (b) in the defensive, symmetric case, only the full coalition is stable
Economic system · Economics · Externality · International trade · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Spillover effect · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements
Strategies for the international protection of the environment
On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership
Of paradise and power
Terrorism, Crime, and Public Policy
The Political Economy of Terrorism
How Strong are Shared Values in the Transatlantic Relationship
The ‘War on terror’
Converging Under Pressure? Counterterrorism Policy Developments in the European Union Member States
The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures
How Europe and America Defend Themselves
Counterterrorism
Gender Imbalance and Terrorism in Developing Countries
Distribution of Transnational Terrorism Among Countries by Income Class and Geography After 9/11
Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence
UN conventions, technology and retaliation in the fight against terrorism
A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism
Contending cultures of counterterrorism
The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,57 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2019 - 2025 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 4 |