Economic Sanctions and Demand for Protection

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6285952
AutoresAmy Pond (0000-0002-6908-2791, Texas A&M University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen61
Número5
Páginas1073-1094
Fecha de publicación2017-05-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002715596777
OpenAlexW2399177280
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas24
Referencias citadas31

How do the distributional consequences of economic sanctions impact future trade policy? Regardless of whether sanctions are effective in achieving concessions, sanctions restrict international trade flows, creating rents for import-competing producers, who are protected from international competition. These rents can then be used to pressure the government to implement protectionist policies. Thus, while the lifting of sanctions directly facilitates some international transactions, sanctions also have an indirect effect. They create powerful domestic interest groups in the sanctioned country who seek market protection. I use multiple estimators to evaluate the effect of trade sanctions on tariff rates. The evidence is consistent with the argument that sanctions increase market protection in both the short and long run

Argument (complex analysis · Business · Commercial policy · Economic policy · Economic rent · Economic sanctions · Economics · Government (linguistics · International economics · International trade · Market economy · Political science · Protectionism · Public economics · Sanctions · Tariff · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Economic, Social, and Public Health Issues in Russia and Globally · Global trade and economics · Law