Strategies of "real" opponents in eliciting cooperative choice in a Prisoner's Dilemma game
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6286007 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Edwin Bixenstine, V Edwin Bixenstine (Kent State University), Jacquelyn W Gaebelein (Kent State University) |
| Año | 1971 |
| Volumen | 15 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 157-166 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1971-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277101500204 |
| OpenAlex | W1966289978 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 16 |
| Referencias citadas | 11 |
Early work by Scodel et al. (1959) and in our laboratory has revealed that, contrary to expectancy (Luce and Raiffa, 1957), iteration of a two-person, two-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game in which choice was simultaneous for both persons resulted in growing competition rather than ultimate cooperation. That, iteration would produce a cooperative resolution, is logical and fitting, out of consideration both for maximum gain and for cordial social regard. Rapoport and his followers (see Rapoport and Chammah, 1965) have since found that a prolonged iterative seriesmuch longer than that previously employed by other researchers-recapitulated the general growth of competition up to about 100 iterations, but thereafter, subject pairs tend to segregate into hawks (those who continued in mutual competition), doves (those who achieve fairly complete mutual cooperation), or mugwumps (those who move away from
Competition (biology · Dilemma · Economics · Expectancy theory · Game theory · Management · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Prisoner's dilemma · Social dilemma · Subject (documents · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics
Sex differences in cooperation
Impression Management in Bargaining
Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation
Measurement of Competitive-Cooperative Attitudes
Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games
Effects of initial choices in the prisoner's dilemma
Development of a model of rule use in negotiation interaction
Beyond Deterrence
Role enactment versus typology
The Social Psychology of Arms Control and Reciprocation
Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Cooperation in the Decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Transforming Competitive or Cooperative Climates
Strategies for Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary
Elicitation of Cooperation by Retaliatory and Nonretaliatory Strategies in a Mixed-Motive Game
Analyzing Negotiation Tactics
Prisoner's Dilemma
Cooperative Behavior in a Mixed-Motive Game
Comparison of individuals and pairs as participants in a mixed-motive game
Some descriptive aspects of two-person non-zero-sum games
Cooperative choice in a Prisoner's Dilemma game
Trust and suspicion
Effects of level of cooperative choice by the other player on choices in a prisoner's dilemma game
Effects of level of cooperative choice by the other player on choices in a prisoner's dilemma game. Part II
The influence of some types of power relationships and game strategies upon the development of interpersonal trust
Internationalism-isolationism, strategy of the other player, and two-person game behavior
| Obras citantes distintas | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,3 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1973 - 2011 (39) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 15 |