The absence of political constitutionalism in the EU

Three Models for Enhancing Constitutional Agency

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6289147
AutoresAndrew Glencro (0000-0001-8320-9181, autor de correspondencia), Andrew Glencross
Año2014
Volumen21
Número8
Páginas1163-1180
Fecha de publicación2014-09-14
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13501763.2014.909871
OpenAlexW1968413655
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9
Referencias citadas45

This article argues that EU constitutionalization has taken place in the absence of political constitutionalism. This concept is defined as the ability of citizens and member states to act as ongoing constitutional agents in determining the evolution of individual rights and national prerogatives. A historical comparison with Swiss and American constitutional development is used to show the development of two forms of political constitutionalism: respectively, direct democracy and presidentialization. These mechanisms allowed territorial units and citizens to influence major constitutional debate outside parliamentary channels. However, attempts to replicate these forms of political constitutionalism in the EU are impractical and undesirable because they fail to respect the political equality of member states and citizens. A more promising avenue is the development of ‘politicization' by providing an opportunity to oppose EU policies via national parliaments and civil society. Indeed, engendering constitutional agency can create a novel democratic bond across demoi

Agency (philosophy · Constitutional economics · Constitutional law · Constitutionalism · Democracy · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Social science · Sociology · European and International Law Studies · European Union Policy and Governance · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Public Administration