The ECB and the inflation monsters

Strategic Framing and the Responsibility Imperative (1998–2023)

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6289862
AutoresAurélien Goutsmedt (0000-0002-3788-7237, F.R.S.-FNRS; ISPOLE, UcLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, autor de correspondencia), Clément Fontan (0000-0001-6283-8931, ISPOLE & IEE, UcLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)
Año2024
Volumen31
Número4
Páginas999-1025
Fecha de publicación2024-04-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13501763.2023.2281583
OpenAlexW4388808676
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9
Referencias citadas47

The recent resurgence of inflation in Europe has led the ECB to increase interest rates and phase out asset purchase programs designed to address the effects of the Great Financial Crisis. This article investigates how the ECB adjusts its logic of responsibility throughout this series of crises. Using a topic model and in-depth analysis of speeches, we examine the ECB's strategic framing of causal linkages related to inflation during three historical periods: the Central Bank Independence (CBI) era (1998-2011), the secular stagnation era (2011-2021), and the new inflation era (2021-). Our findings indicate that modifications made to the CBI's causal linkages during the secular stagnation era shaped the ECB's framing of the new inflation era in a novel way. However, despite acknowledging difficult policy tradeoffs, which they tended to obscure in the past, ECB policymakers still seek to uphold the imperative of responsibility by adapting it to varying policy contexts

Economics · Framing (construction · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Credit Risk and Financial Regulations · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · History