Conflict among member states and the influence of the Commission in EMU politics
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6290897 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Zdenek Kudrna (University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria), Fabio Wasserfallen (0000-0002-5157-7163, University of Bern, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2021 |
| Volumen | 28 |
| Número | 6 |
| Páginas | 902-913 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2021-06-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429 |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13501763.2020.1751681 |
| OpenAlex | W3023984026 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 9 |
| Referencias citadas | 29 |
The recent reforms of the euro zone are best explained in three steps: (a) member states’ preferences were determined by national governments on the basis of their economic interests, which are interpreted through a distinct set of ideas, (b) the diverging preferences among member states translated into a straightforward intergovernmental bargaining setting, and (c) the European Commission maintained a leading role throughout the process of negotiating policy outcomes. On the interstate bargaining level, all major reform proposals were negotiated between two opposing groups of member states: one advocating for fiscal discipline and the other asking for more burden sharing and transfers. In this intergovernmental bargaining setting, the Commission was influential in policy negotiations and in turning the political compromises into reform outcomes. Taken together, the politics of euro zone reform were shaped by the conflict among two opposing coalitions of member states and the influential role of the Commission
Collective bargaining · Commission · Economic policy · Economics · European commission · European union · Member state · Member states · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Public Administration · Regional Development and Policy
The European Commission as a Policy Entrepreneur under the European Semester
Challenges to the European single market at thirty
The physical completion of the EU’s single market
Supranational authorities and private actors as drivers of single market integration? The state of the Union in electricity and banking
The Reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union During the Euro Crisis
The determinants of euro zone development
Introducing the debate section
Between power and powerlessness in the euro zone crisis and thereafter
Not so independent? The effect of Commissioners’ attributes on EU member states’ bargaining success
The Euro and the Battle of Ideas
Why the European Commission is not the “unexpected winner” of the Euro Crisis
The political dynamics behind Europe’s new banking union
Public opinion and the crisis
Position-taking in the Euro crisis
Varieties of capitalism in light of the euro crisis
The determinants of euro zone development
Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis
Between power and powerlessness in the euro zone crisis and thereafter
Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data
Crisis bargaining in the European Union
Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone
Political conflict in the reform of the Eurozone
Dimensions and alignments in european union politics
Comparative Institutional Advantage in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis
The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis
Institutional Arrangements and Logrolling
The Contested Council
Parties in the Council
Brake and broker
The role of the EU institutions in establishing the banking union. Collaborative leadership in the EMU reform process
Why the EU’s constitutional deadlock is hampering EMU reforms, and how this could be resolved
European integration and the crisis
Money Makes theEUGo Round
Political and Economic Integration in the EU
Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform
| Citas por año | 1,8 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Altamente citado | No |