May’s theorem in one dimension
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6299308 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jim Duggan (0000-0001-8554-2594, University of Rochester, autor de correspondencia), John Duggan |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 29 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 3-21 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629815603694 |
| OpenAlex | W2402421972 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 9 |
This paper provides three versions of May’s theorem on majority rule, adapted to the one-dimensional model common in formal political modeling applications. The key contribution is that single peakedness of voter preferences allows us to drop May’s restrictive positive responsiveness axiom. The simplest statement of the result holds when voter preferences are single peaked and linear (no indifferences), in which case a voting rule satisfies anonymity, neutrality, Pareto, and transitivity of weak social preference if and only if the number of individuals is odd and the rule is majority rule
Anonymity · Arrow's impossibility theorem · Axiom · Combinatorics · Computer security · Dimension (graph theory · Econometrics · Economics · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Neutrality · Pareto principle · Political science · Politics · Preference · Revealed preference · Social choice theory · Statement (logic · Statistics · Transitive relation · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics
A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
Social Choice and Individual Values
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model
Manipulation and Single-Peakedness
A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,14 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2019 - 2019 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |