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Representative Government and Special Interest Politics

We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6299359
AutoresSusanne Lohmann (0000-0002-1478-4534, autor de correspondencia)
Año2003
Volumen15
Número3
Páginas299-319
Fecha de publicación2003-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951692803015003004
OpenAlexW2087785915
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14
Referencias citadas18

In any society characterized by diversity and specialization, each citizen - the butcher, the baker, the candlestick-maker - is a special interest on some dimensions of public policy and a member of the general public on many other dimensions. Each citizen enjoys being at the receiving end of special interest handouts even at the expense of inefficiencies imposed on general public. But relative to the status quo involving inefficient redistribution on most dimensions of public policy, including many dimensions on which the citizen is a member of the general public, the vast majority of citizens would surely be better off if the government did not cater to special interests at all. With this common interest in place, why do democratic societies have such a hard time ridding themselves of special interest politics? This article argues that the driving force underlying special interest politics is an information asymmetry: each citizen has a precise idea about the special interest handouts she is receiving and a vague idea about the price she is paying, as a member of the general public, for inefficient redistribution. I explain why special interest politics are ultimately impervious to reform (though we can tame them at the margin); I examine the trade-offs inherent in reform efforts (what it costs to tame them); and I spell out why special interest politics can be a Good Thing (why we should not tame them all the way even if we could

Democracy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public good · Public interest · Redistribution (election · Special Interest Group · Status quo · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration

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    Austin Murphy•Economic and Political Studies•2019

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    Open Access•Michael Lipton•Verfassung in Recht und Übersee•1978

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    Open Access•Susanne Lohmann•American Political Science Review•1998

Obras citantes distintas14
Citas por año0,64
Intervalo de citas2004 - 2021 (18)
Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 14
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