The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching by Incumbent Members of Congress, 1947–2000

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6300633
AutoresChristian R Grose (0000-0002-3719-3155, Lawrence University), Antoine Yoshinaka (0000-0001-7118-0473, University of Rochester)
Año2003
Volumen28
Número1
Páginas55-75
Fecha de publicación2003-02-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.3162/036298003x200809
OpenAlexW2014092183
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas44
Referencias citadas20

What are the electoral consequences of switching parties for incumbent members of Congress? Do incumbents who switch fare better or worse after their switch? Aldrich (1995) and Aldrich and Bianco (1992) present a model of party affiliation for all candidates. We empirically extend this model for incumbent legislators who have switched parties. Specifically, we look at the universe of incumbent representatives who have run for Congress under more than one party label since World War II. We find that the primary and general election vote shares for party switchers are not as high after the switch as before. Additionally, we learn that party switching causes the primaries in the switcher's party and in the the opposing party (the switcher's “old” party) to become more competitive in the short run. Over the long run, however, primaries in the switcher's new party are less competitive than those in the old party before the switch

Business · Democracy · Economics · General election · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Primary election · Single non-transferable vote · Whip (tree · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Social Policy and Reform Studies