The (Financial) Ties That Bind

Social Networks of Intraparty Caucuses

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6301045
AutoresSorelle Wyckoff Gaynor (0000-0003-3545-6182, University of Maryland, College Park, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen47
Número4
Páginas885-920
Fecha de publicación2022-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/lsq.12360
OpenAlexW3199410040
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas34

Intraparty caucuses in the US Congress are often recognized for the information sharing, voting blocs, and personal relationships they facilitate. This article introduces an additional benefit to joining intraparty caucuses: campaign donations. Applying social network analysis and exponential random graph models to the 115th and 116th Congresses, I find that members are more likely to donate to their fellow caucus members than other members in Congress. In addition, I find that party leaders, particularly Republican party leaders, are less likely to donate to members that join intraparty caucuses, indicating that Leadership PAC funding is strategic for rank‐and‐file members and party leaders alike. This article adds to our understanding of intraparty caucuses, particularly their role in facilitating member‐to‐member campaign donations, and the relationship between caucus members and party leaders

Caucus · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Social Media and Politics