Does “Ought” Imply “Feasible

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6325792
AutoresNicholas Southwood (0000-0002-5308-8814, Princeton University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2016
Volumen44
Número1
Páginas7-45
Fecha de publicación2016-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/papa.12067
OpenAlexW2510417116
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas31
Referencias citadas24

Imagine a mercantile and materialistic polity, Pecunia, in which achieving a modest improvement in the economic position of the poor by progressive taxation is infeasible inasmuch as most members of the middle--class majority simply cannot bring themselves to work at the requisite level of intensity for less pecuniary gain (cf Cohen 2008, ch. 1).Now consider the claim that (1) The Pecunians ought to improve the economic position of the poor by progressive taxation.What should our reaction be to normative claims such as (1) that make infeasible demands?The reaction that many of us in fact have, I take it, is to feel deeply conflicted (see Nagel 1991, ch.2).On the one hand, claims such as (1) seem to be evidently false in virtue of demanding the infeasible (Goodin and Pettit 1995;Brennan and Southwood 2007

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