Fundraising for Favors? Linking Lobbyist-Hosted Fundraisers to Legislative Benefits
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6339752 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Amy Melissa Mckay (0000-0002-4497-2456, University of Exeter, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2018 |
| Volumen | 71 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 869-880 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2018-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Political Research Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912918771745 |
| OpenAlex | W2801886116 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 23 |
| Referencias citadas | 54 |
Do legislators and lobbyists trade favors? This study uses uncommon data sources and plagiarism software to detect a rarely observed relationship between interest group lobbyists and sitting Members of Congress. Comparison of letters to a Senate committee written by lobby groups to legislative amendments introduced by committee members reveals similar and even identical language, providing compelling evidence that groups persuaded legislators to introduce amendments valued by the group. Moreover, the analysis suggests that these language matches are more likely when the requesting lobby group hosts a fundraising event for the senator. The results hold while controlling for ideological agreement between the senator and the group, the group’s campaign contributions to the senator, and the group’s lobbying expenditures, annual revenue, and home-state connections
Business · House of Representatives · Ideology · Interest group · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Revenue · State (computer science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Accounting
Do political donors have greater access to government officials? Evidence from a Foia field experiment with US municipalities
Measuring stakeholder influence
Paying for Legitimacy
“Favoring those who contributed to their political campaigns”
Beyond descriptive representation
Financiamiento de campañas y cabildeo
No, political actors do not get their message into the news
Reward of legislating
Conflating Lobbying and PACs
The surge of the small donorate in U.S. elections
Gift Travel in the U.S. House of Representatives
Philanthropic Funding for Community and Economic Development
Social Lobbying
Strategic Lobbying and the Pressure to Compromise Member Interests
Policy Consequences of Revolving-Door Lobbying
Either with Us or Against Us
More than Mere Access
When do political parties listen to interest groups
Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act
Agency Independence, Campaign Contributions, and Favoritism in US Federal Government Contracting
Exploring information exchange among interest groups
Politicians’ Private Sector Jobs and Parliamentary Behavior
Gender, Race, and Intersectionality in the Political Donations of America's Corporate Elite
Lobbying in the European Union
American Public Opinion, Advocacy, and Policy in Congress
Lobbying and Policy Change
Basic Interests
Greasing the Wheels
Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets
Political connections and preferential access to finance
An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups
A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference
Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering
Lobbying influence
Some talk
Corporate campaign contributions and abnormal stock returns after presidential elections
A simple way of estimating interest group ideology
A Meta‐Analysis of Campaign Contributions' Impact on Roll Call Voting
Cluster–Robust Variance Estimation for Dyadic Data
A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy
Purchasing Protection? The Effect of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy
Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress
All Votes Are Not Created Equal
Money and Access
A Foot in the Door
Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change
Campaign Professionalism and Fundraising in Congressional Elections
Federalism and Health Care Reform
Shaping Health Reform
Allocating Lobbying Resources between Collective and Private Rents
Before the Roll Call
The Supreme Court and Opinion Content
Congressional Parties, Fundraising, and Committee Ambition
Funding Mechanisms and Policy Instruments
PACs, Issue Context, and Congressional Decisionmaking
Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Analysis
A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Votes
Lobbying and Taxes
Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials
Senators as Political Entrepreneurs
Tracing the Flow of Policy Ideas in Legislatures
Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace
Interest Groups and Political Time
More Bang for the Buck
Politics and Money
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Buying Time
The Logic of Collective Action
Legislators and Interest Groups
The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy
| Obras citantes distintas | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3,83 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 22 |