Turning a Blind Eye to Bribery

Explaining Failures to Comply with the International Anti-corruption Regime

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6344804
AutoresJo-Anne Gilbert (Griffith University), J C Sharman (0000-0002-7727-1496, Griffith University)
Año2016
Volumen64
Número1
Páginas74-89
Fecha de publicación2016-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9248.12153
OpenAlexW1577652093
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas23

This article questions rationalist and constructivist expectations that democracies are conditioned to comply with international rules prohibiting foreign bribery. It employs process-tracing case studies to addresses challenges of endogeneity and selection effects that have resulted in an overstated picture of compliance with international agreements. Successive British and Australian governments have demonstrated a pattern of wilful blindness toward major violations of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. These enforcement failures reflect a disinclination to comply – not a lack of ability. Previously, constructivist scholars have overstated the power of moral suasion, and rationalists have failed to fully appreciate the incentives for democratic governments to ignore corrupt conduct, relative to the politically expedient priorities of being seen to promote and protect jobs and export earnings, and minimize adverse media coverage. The article thus contests the conventional wisdom concerning the anti-corruption successes of developed democracies. More generally, it cautions against excessively optimistic conclusions on compliance with international agreements

Compliance (psychology · Convention · Democracy · Economics · Endogeneity · Enforcement · Incentive · Language change · Law and economics · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Corruption and Economic Development · International Arbitration and Investment Law · Law · Psychology · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Social Psychology