Three Models of Republican Rights

Juridical, Parliamentary and Populist

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6345183
AutoresGuy Aitchison (0000-0002-9083-7028, Max Weber Programme, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen65
Número2
Páginas339-355
Fecha de publicación2017-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0032321716648339
OpenAlexW2473849596
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas53

The republican tradition in political theory offers a distinct approach to thinking about rights that addresses long-standing objections to the depoliticising logic of the discourse through its attention to power relations and the socially embedded nature of moral claims. However, the most systematic republican theories of rights-based citizenship translate these theoretical commitments into a tame set of institutional proposals that largely affirm existing states. In this article, I critique the limits of Philip Pettit’s juridical republicanism and Richard Bellamy’s parliamentary republicanism and set out an alternative populist account of republican citizenship based on the notion of rights as ‘claims’ – a form of speech act that empowers agents with self-respect to mobilise popular support and challenge arbitrary power when political institutions are unresponsive or unavailable. Populist citizenship takes place whenever social groups and classes mobilise directly outside constitutional structures in order to contest the legitimacy of the political regime and lay claim to new rights through direct appeal to the sovereign authority of the people themselves

Appeal · Citizenship · CONTEST · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Political science · Politics · Popular sovereignty · Power (physics · Sociology · Sovereignty · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Political Theology and Sovereignty