Spinoza on Positive Freedom

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6345646
AutoresDavid West (Australian National University), David W West (0000-0003-3876-720X, Australian National University, autor de correspondencia)
Año1993
Volumen41
Número2
Páginas284-296
Fecha de publicación1993-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9248.1993.tb01407.x
OpenAlexW2035297977
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11

Much of the liberal tradition in political thought has shared Isaiah Berlin's fears about all positive concepts of liberty. Indeed these fears seem justified in relation to Marx and Hegel. However, the danger of a tyrannical paternalism derives not from the concept of positive freedom itself but from the reification of the self associated with rationalism. Spinoza's monism and his notion of individual conatus make any rationalist reification of the self implausible. Consequently his account of positive freedom enriches rather than undermines the commitment to negative liberty, whilst also helping to explain his ability to reconcile liberal toleration with the strikingly Hobbesian premisses of his political philosophy

Epistemology · Hegelianism · Law and economics · Monism · Negative liberty · Pluralism (philosophy · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Reification (Marxism · Relation (database · Sociology · Toleration · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Political Theology and Sovereignty · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought