Disaggregating Political Authority

What’s Wrong with Rawlsian Civil Disobedience

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6345969
AutoresRobert Jubb (0000-0002-0956-4000, University of Reading, Reading, UK, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen67
Número4
Páginas955-971
Fecha de publicación2019-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0032321718816208
OpenAlexW2909575681
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas20
Referencias citadas23

John Rawls is a central figure in contemporary philosophical and theoretical discussions of civil disobedience, which hope to contribute to significant political debates around when and in which forms political dissent, protest and resistance are appropriate. Ignoring the frame in which Rawls discusses civil disobedience has led critics to wrongly attack his theory for being too restrictive when it is more likely to be too permissive. That permissiveness depends on treating any political order which does not come close to fulfilling his theory of justice as absolutely illegitimate. In this sense, Rawls’ theory of political authority is binary and demanding. The problems his theory shares with most others, including his critics’, show that political authority needs to be disaggregated to make sense of the conditions under which different forms of protest and resistance are appropriate

Civil disobedience · Dissent · Economic Justice · Economics · Law and economics · Order (exchange · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Resistance (ecology · Sociology · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification