On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6350487
AutoresJohn N Cray (Jesus College, Oxford, autor de correspondencia)
Año1977
Volumen5
Número3
Páginas331-348
Fecha de publicación1977-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0090-5917 • E-ISSN: 1552-7476
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/009059177700500304
OpenAlexW164768207
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas42

tHE AIM OF THIS PAPER is to explore some of the philosophical problems generated by recent attempts to develop systematically the thesis that certain of the centrally important concepts of social and political thought have an essentially contested character. My investigation has two phases. First, after making some brief, exploratory remarks about the origin and sense of the notion of an essentially contested concept, I try to display some of the initial plausibility and explanatory power of the thesis that some, if not all, of the chief concepts of social and political theory are essentially contested concepts, to identify some of the variants in which an essential contestability thesis may be advanced, and to specify some of the difficulties, ambiguities, and weaknesses inherent in each of these variants. Second, I try to sketch an understanding of essential contestability which avoids the difficulties of previous conceptions while preserving their explanatory power and philosophical interest. I conclude by indicating how the philosophical research program generated by this revised account shows that recent attempts to deny the autonomy of political philosophy are misconceived, and

Autonomy · Character (mathematics · Economics · Epistemology · Explanatory power · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Power (physics · Sketch · Social character · Social science · Sociology · Computer Science · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics