Accuracy and Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasting by the Administration, the CBO, and the Federal Reserve Board

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6356989
AutoresJohn P Frendreis (0000-0001-6026-3265), John Frendreis, Raymond Tatalovich (0000-0002-2670-0959)
Año2000
Volumen32
Número4
Páginas623-632
Fecha de publicación2000-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolity (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0032-3497 • E-ISSN: 1744-1684
EditorialUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.2307/3235295
OpenAlexW2321939094
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas1

Short-term forecasts of nominal GNP/GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment by the administration, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Federal Reserve Board are compared for accuracy and for political bias. The most accurate forecasting is done by the CBO, with the Fed a close second. There is also a partisan bias at work within the administration, indicating that decision-makers internalize their policy fears by exaggerating the macroeconomic problem of concern to their core political constituency. Thus, Republican administrations over-forecast inflation and Democratic administrations over-forecast unemployment

Administration (probate law · Core (optical fiber · Democracy · Economic policy · Economics · Federal budget · Inflation (cosmology · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Political science · Politics · Reagan administration · Unemployment · Work (physics · Economic Policies and Impacts · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact · Public Administration