The Administrative Presidency as Reactive Oversight

Implications for Positive and Normative Theory

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6360809
AutoresWilliam F West (Texas A&M University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2015
Volumen75
Número4
Páginas523-533
Fecha de publicación2015-03-25
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPublic Administration Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/puar.12363
OpenAlexW2022805097
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas48

The fact that centralized executive oversight of agency policy making is primarily reactive reflects the motives and constraints that define the president's relationship with the domestic bureaucracy. Such a strategy allows for the allocation of limited resources to agency initiatives that are inconsistent with the president's agenda or that evoke conflict within the executive branch or the larger political system. This calls into question the descriptive model of presidential administration as proactive management by a unitary actor, as well as its prescriptive corollary that equates a strong executive with coordination across the bureaucracy. Reactive presidential oversight can produce a kind of ad hoc coordination that can be salutary, but its often pluralistic character can also undermine other important values in the administrative process

Administration (probate law · Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Corollary · Economics · Executive branch · Law and economics · Normative · Political science · Politics · Presidency · Presidential system · Sociology · Unitary state · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies