Collective Action, City Council Committees, and State Aid to Cities
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6405409 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Bertram Johnson (Middlebury College, Vermont, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2007 |
| Volumen | 42 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 457-478 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2007-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Urban Affairs Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1078-0874 • E-ISSN: 1552-8332 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1078087406292522 |
| OpenAlex | W2102200003 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 28 |
Studies of city council committee structures offer the potential to shed light both on the dynamics of local politics and on broader theories of legislative organization. Pelissero and Krebs (1997) find that larger councils are more likely to have committee structures and that committees have limited influence on policy outputs, contrary to what distributive models of legislative organization would predict. The author replicates Pelissero and Krebs’s finding on council size but suggests a different interpretation of these results, focusing not on theories of distributive politics but on the collective action dynamics within city councils. Instead of being havens for high-demanding legislators, city council committees are tools with which a council as a whole can more effectively provide collective goods to its city. Finally, the author presents a simple test of whether councils with committees are better able to provide public goods, using state aid as the dependent variable
Action (physics · Collective action · Distributive property · Economics · Interpretation (philosophy · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Public good · State (computer science · Urban politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
The decline and resurgence of Congress
Congress, keystone of the Washington establishment
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Governing the Commons
Information and Legislative Organization
Official Leadership in the City
The Critical Mass in Collective Action
Delegating Powers
Locally Weighted Regression
Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision
Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing Scatterplots
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
The Logic of Collective Action
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Social Choice and Individual Values
The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives
When Do Rules of Procedure Matter
Cooperation and Group Size in the N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
City Council Legislative Committees and Policy-making in Large United States Cities
Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas
Individual and structural solutions to resource dilemmas in two cultures
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy in the United States
A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action
Social Dilemmas
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,09 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2015 - 2015 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |