Humiliation and Third-Party Aggression
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6411599 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Joslyn Barnhart, Joslyn N Barnhart (0000-0002-8661-6118, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 69 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 532-568 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | World Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0043-8871 • E-ISSN: 1086-3338 |
| Editorial | Project MUSE (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0043887117000028 |
| OpenAlex | W2619139980 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 21 |
| Referencias citadas | 83 |
There is a growing consensus that status concerns drive state behavior. Although recent attention has been paid to when states are most likely to act on behalf of status concerns, very little is known about which actions states are most likely to engage in when their status is threatened. This article focuses on the effect of publicly humiliating international events as sources of status threat. Such events call into question a state's image in the eyes of others, thereby increasing the likelihood that the state will engage in reassertions of its status. The article presents a theory of status reassertion that outlines which states will be most likely to respond, as well as when and how they will be most likely to do so. The author argues that because high-status states have the most to lose from repeated humiliation, they will be relatively risk averse when reasserting their status. In contrast to prior work arguing that humiliation drives a need for revenge, the author demonstrates that great powers only rarely engage in direct revenge. Rather, they pursue the less risky option of projecting power abroad against weaker states to convey their intentions of remaining a great power. The validity of this theory is tested using an expanded and recoded data set of territorial change from 1816 to 2000. Great powers that have experienced a humiliating, involuntary territorial loss are more likely to attempt aggressive territorial gains in the future and, in particular, against third-party states
Aggression · Criminology · Embarrassment · Humiliation · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Sociology · State (computer science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Political Conflict and Governance · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Russia and the prestige of multipolarity
The politics of international solidarity
Norm Compliance and International Status
Back of the queue
The power of disrespect
Rebranding China
Homelands and Nationalism
Flexibility and Firmness in Crisis Bargaining
Denying the Obvious
Moral guilt and small states’ status redemption
Can Status Competition Save the World? Grafting, Green Energy, and the Climate Crisis
The Status of Status in World Politics
Humiliation and International Conflict Preferences
We have nothing to do with it
Pride and Prejudice
Provocation, Bargaining, and War
The Consequences of Defeat
Provocation, Public Opinion, and International Disputes
Why Territorial Disputes Escalate
Endogenous preferences, credible signaling, and the security dilemma
Taking interaction seriously
A Theoretical Model of Triggered Displaced Aggression
Intergroup Emotions and Intergroup Relations
Temporal comparison theory.
Self-Esteem, Narcissism, and Aggression
Rational Ritual
Honor, Symbols, and War
The Steps to War
Status in World Politics
The evolution of prestige
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
Humiliation
Respect and disrespect in international politics
Humiliation and the Inertia Effect
Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif in International Politics
Healing the cycles of humiliation
Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy
Territorial Changes, 1816–1996
Charting A Course To Conflict
The European partition of Africa
Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985
Displaced aggression is alive and well
You dissin me? Humiliation and post 9/11 global politics
Symbols of statehood
Status As a Valued Resource
Status Seekers
Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment
Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb
Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy
Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons
Bloody Revenge
Social Identity and Intergroup Relations
Tournament of Shadows
History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925
Myths of Empire
Self-evaluative effects of temporal and social comparison
Holding your place
This will bring shame on our nation’
Group-based emotions as determinants of ingroup identification
When the pressure is up
National Insecurities
The humiliation dynamic
Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation
Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War
Honor and War
Clearing the Hurdle
Territorial Diversion
Back to the Future
What’s in a Claim? De Jure versus De Facto Borders in Interstate Territorial Disputes
Reevaluating Alliance Reliability
Multiple Audiences and Reputation Building in International Conflicts
Bones of Contention
When Will They Ever Learn
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests
Power Positions
Status Inconsistency and International War
Status Deficits and War
Revisiting Reputation
The Territorial Integrity Norm
Losing Face and Sinking Costs
Anarchy and identity
Anarchy and the limits of cooperation
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Settled Borders and Regime Type
Obsession with status and ressentiment
Status Competition and Territorial Aggression
Reputations and deterrence
Revenge in International Politics
Prestige and the origins of war
Status insecurity and temporality in world politics
The Role of Honor-Related Values in the Elicitation, Experience, and Communication of Pride, Shame, and Anger
Power, Status, and International War
Polarization Between Occupier and Occupied in Post-Saddam Iraq
Introducing Archigos
A Structural Theory of Aggression
War and Revenge
| Obras citantes distintas | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 21 |