When Misperception Matters

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6412349
AutoresArthur A Stein (0000-0002-1955-2898, University of California System, autor de correspondencia)
Año1982
Volumen34
Número4
Páginas505-526
Fecha de publicación1982-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaWorld Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0043-8871 • E-ISSN: 1086-3338
EditorialProject MUSE (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.2307/2010332
OpenAlexW2156361636
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas41
Referencias citadas13

This essay is an analysis of the implications of misperception—the inaccurate assessment by one actor of the other actor's preferences—in international relations. The author finds that misperception cannot affect the choice of an actor with a dominant strategy, although it can affect that actor's expectations as long as both actors are self-interested and seek to maximize their own payoffs. Misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations, and even then the misperceived actor has no incentive to mask its true preferences. An actor who deceives does so in order to facilitate coordination through the other's misperception of its preferences, and thus to avoid conflict—not to create it. Three possible outcomes can occur when both actors misperceive, and in only one of the three does misperception cause conflict that would otherwise be avoidable. In a formal analysis of the limited set of situations that characterize international crises, misperception is found neither to create conflict nor to lead to the escalation of crisis into war

Affect (linguistics · Economics · Incentive · International conflict · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Set (abstract data type · Computer Science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology