Propaganda to persuade

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6445307
AutoresTinghua Yu (0000-0002-8526-048X, London School of Economics and Political Science, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen9
Número2
Páginas438-444
Fecha de publicación2019-09-24
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psrm.2019.41
OpenAlexW2976086477
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas24

I analyze a model in which an incumbent ruler designs a rule for propaganda disclosure that reveals information about her competence to her allies and opponents. A message that increases beliefs about the incumbent's competence is considered as propaganda. I show that for propaganda to be persuasive, it must be limited in frequency. I also demonstrate how various features of the environment affect the frequency of propaganda. Propaganda increases in frequency as the incumbent's allies become more dependent on her and as her opponents become weaker. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of the conflict of interest between both her allies and her opponents and the frequency of propaganda. As conflict increases, the frequency of propaganda decreases up to a threshold beyond which increased conflict is associated with more frequent propaganda

Affect (linguistics · Competence (human resources · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Ruler · Sociology · Communication · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Media Influence and Politics · Psychology · Social Psychology