The distinctiveness of relational equality

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6445494
AutoresDevon Ca (0000-0002-0607-2086, Nova University of Lisbon, Portugal, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen24
Número1
Páginas51-71
Fecha de publicación2024-05-20
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitics Philosophy & Economics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1470-594X • E-ISSN: 1741-3060
EditorialSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1470594x241251389
OpenAlexW4398140218
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas60

In recent years, a distinction between two concepts of equality has been much discussed: “distributive” equality involves people having equal amounts of a good such as welfare or resources, and “social” or “relational” equality involves the absence of (certain kinds of) social hierarchy and the presence of (certain kinds of) equal social relations. This contrast is commonly thought to have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between equality and justice. But the nature and significance of the distinction is far from clear. I examine several accounts of this issue and argue none are entirely satisfactory. In turn, I offer an alternative proposal. Relational equality, on my account, involves a concern with each person having an equal “civic status.” I characterize this concern and show it has distinctive and normatively significant positional and temporal aspects

Optimal distinctiveness theory · Computer Science · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology