Action and Responsibility

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6556540
AutoresAndrew Sneddon (0000-0001-8013-6722, University of Ottawa, autor de correspondencia)
Año2006
Fecha de publicación2006-01-01
Open AccessNo
TipoBOOK
RevistaAction and Responsibility (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialSpringer London, Limited (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/1-4020-3982-4
OpenAlexW569760490
Open LibraryOL37087384M, OL9618090M
ISBN9781402039829, 9781402039966
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas13

What makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions

Astrophysics · Media studies · Physics · Political science · Sociology · Complex Systems and Decision Making · Disaster Management and Resilience · History · Act (philosophy) · Ethics · Ethics & Moral Philosophy · Events (Philosophy) · Metaphysics · Mind & Body · Philosophy · Philosophy (General) · Philosophy of mind · Responsibility · Social sciences