The Dynamics of a Policy Outcome

Market Response and Bureaucratic Enforcement of a Policy Change

Datos Bibliográficos

ID7236051
AutoresSteven Callander (0000-0003-2510-0414, Stanford University), Dana Foarta (Stanford University, autor de correspondencia), Takuo Sugaya (0000-0001-5104-5469, Stanford University)
Año2023
Volumen68
Número4
Páginas1252-1265
Fecha de publicación2023-03-22
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12784
OpenAlexW4353029417
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas17

Policy outcomes are determined not by the words in a statute but by the actions of private citizens. A policy's success or failure depends on how it shapes behavior and how that behavior shapes the future course of policy. To understand this process, we develop a model that combines the political and nonpolitical domains, focusing on competition policy and the regulation of markets. We show how the outcome of a policy change develops over time as firms respond in the market and interact with bureaucratic enforcement. We identify a critical threshold in market structure that determines whether a policy succeeds or fails, and discuss how the design of political institutions affects this level. The threshold represents a balancing of the path dependence of politics with the self‐correcting nature of markets. It establishes when political forces dominate those in markets and, thus, when a policy change has lasting effects on society

Bureaucracy · Competition policy · Economics · Enforcement · Market economy · Market structure · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Corporate Finance and Governance · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

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