The Effect of Formal and Informal Contracting Mechanisms on Implementation Performance in the U.S. Federalist System
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 7332003 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jessica N Terman, Jessica Terman (0000-0001-9364-024X, George Mason University, autor de correspondencia), Richard C Feiock, Richard Feiock (0000-0001-5215-0391, Florida State University) |
| Año | 2015 |
| Volumen | 42 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 309-331 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2015-11-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Local Government Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0300-3930 • E-ISSN: 1743-9388 |
| Editorial | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/03003930.2015.1110522 |
| OpenAlex | W2270785544 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 50 |
The relationship between contract management capacity and implementation success in local government contracting is well established. However, less is known about how specific contract mechanisms are linked to this success. This study uses implementation of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program to examine the use of formal and informal contract management techniques in the implementation of energy projects. The use of formal contract mechanisms, such as full and open competitive bidding, contact rescission and outcome-based performance measures, exhibits a statistically significant effect on implementation performance. The findings advance contracting theory and have practical implications for local government contracting and implementation success in fiscal federalism
Bidding · Business · Dilemma · Economics · Federalist · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Local government · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Rescission · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Public Procurement and Policy · Public-Private Partnership Projects · Marketing
Trust Within And Between Organizations
Competing for What
Collaboration in Frontline Health Care Delivery
Bargaining, Networks, and Management of Municipal Development Subsidies
Closer Than “Arms Length”
Remedies in Contract and Tort
Trust' or Law? Towards an Integrated Theory of Contractual Relations between Firms
Government Contracts and “Managing the Market”
Bureaucracy, Organizational Redundancy, and the Privatization of Public Services
Capacity, Guidance, and the Implementation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Bureaucratic Theory Meets Reality
Outsourcing Public Service Delivery
Examining Local Government Service Delivery Arrangements Over Time
Third-Party Federalism
State Social Services Contracting
Contract–Management Capacity in Municipal and County Governments
Managing Public Service Contracts
Improving Outcomes in Fiscal Federalism
Exploring and Explaining Contracting Out
To Trust or Not to Trust? What Matters in Local Government-Vendor Relationships
Agents or Stewards
Relational Contracting and Network Management
The Performance Puzzle
Contracting for Complex Products
Informal Accountability in Multisector Service Delivery Collaborations
The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models
Walking in the Shadow of Pressman and Wildavsky
The Economics of Organization
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,43 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2019 - 2023 (5) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |