Friends You Can Trust
A Signaling Theory of Interest Group Litigation Before the U.S. Supreme Court
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 7462007 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Lucia Manzi (0000-0002-1230-0209), Matthew E K Hall (0000-0002-0802-0415) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 51 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 704-734 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-08-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Law & Society Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0023-9216 • E-ISSN: 1540-5893 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lasr.12280 |
| OpenAlex | W2746970994 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 39 |
How do interest groups influence U.S. Supreme Court justices to vote in favor of their preferred outcomes? Following prior research on the influence of the Solicitor General, we develop and expand on the signaling theory of interest group influence via amicus curie briefs. We argue that an interest group's ideological reputation and the nature of the ideological signal it sends in its brief both function as powerful heuristics that convey information to the justices depending on the justices' own ideological preferences. When an organization files an amicus brief advocating for an outcome seemingly contrary to its traditional preferences (i.e., an unexpected signal), this signal should be more noticeable and credible than a signal in accordance with a group's conventional views (i.e., an expected signal). However, unexpected signals should have greater influence on justices who share the brief filer's preferences. We test our signaling theory on the terms from 1991 through 2002. We find that unexpected signals (but not expected signals) are associated with Supreme Court voting, and the influence of unexpected signals appears to be particularly strong among justices who share the ideological preferences of the brief filer
Heuristics · Ideology · Law and economics · Mistake · Political science · Politics · Reputation · Sociology · Supreme court · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Social Psychology
Friends of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited
The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court
Strategic Information Transmission
Issue Evolution
A simple way of estimating interest group ideology
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Congress
Counteractive Lobbying in the U.S. Supreme Court
Taking Time Seriously
Friends of the Court
Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court
The Dynamics of Interest Representation at the U.S. Supreme Court
Lobbyists before the U.S. Supreme Court
Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999
The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content
Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court
The Value of Biased Information
Amicus Coalition Heterogeneity and Signaling Credibility in Supreme Court Agenda Setting
Interest Group Success in the Courts
Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme Court
Back to the Future
Party Polarization and "Conflict Extension" in the American Electorate
Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
Abortion
Signals from the Tenth Justice
Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace
Heuristic Decision Making
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead
Quality Over Quantity
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,38 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |