Narratives of trust

Sharing Knowledge as a Second-Order Emotion

Datos Bibliográficos

ID7800599
AutoresSimone Belli (0000-0001-8934-7569, Department of Social Science and Innovation , Yachay Tech , Hacienda San José, Ibarra , Imbabura , 010918 , Ecuador, autor de correspondencia), Fernando Broncano (Department of Philosophy , Charles III University of Madrid , Getafe , Madrid Spain)
Año2017
Volumen27
Número3
Páginas241-251
Fecha de publicación2017-07-26
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaHuman Affairs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1210-3055 • E-ISSN: 1337-401X
EditorialWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/humaff-2017-0021
OpenAlexW2741329021
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas41

Our aim is to examine why trust can be considered a second-order emotion and how the way in which trust plays out differently in aesthetic and ordinary contexts can provide another mode of investigating second-order emotions. Our thesis is developed in three sections and a conclusion. In the first section, we perform an example analysis to show why narratives are important for our emotions. In the second section, we examine how trust can be considered a second-order emotion and establish criteria for identifying it as a second-order emotion. In the third section, we present one of the aims of trust, i.e. sharing knowledge between agents, when a testimony-giver shares knowledge in an epistemic trust process with others. We show how the relationship construction between persons thanks to trust, a second-order emotion that represents emotional ties between agents to achieve a first-order emotion

Business · Cognitive psychology · Emotion work · Epistemology · Linguistics · Narrative · Computer Science · Cultural Differences and Values · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Social Representations and Identity