Contesting the European Central Bank in Banking Supervision
Accountability in Practice at the European Parliament
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 7876499 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Adina Maricut-Akbik (0000-0002-8183-5055, Hertie School, Berlin, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2020 |
| Volumen | 58 |
| Número | 5 |
| Páginas | 1199-1214 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2020-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jcms.13024 |
| OpenAlex | W3003375063 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 17 |
| Referencias citadas | 17 |
The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) raised expectations regarding the ability of the European Parliament (EP) to hold the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable for its decisions. This article examines the accountability interactions between the two institutions in the first years of the functioning of the SSM (2013–18). The focus is on the extent to which the EP contests ECB supervisory decisions in practice through letters and public hearings. The analysis shows a frequently‐used infrastructure of political accountability that is however limited in ensuring the contestation of ECB conduct in banking supervision. The study identifies problems with the performance of the EP as an accountability forum and with the tight confidentiality rules of the SSM, which allow the ECB to silence contestation on many politically salient issues. The findings are based on an innovative analytical framework on the study of accountability interactions
Accountability · Business · Confidentiality · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Salient · Silence · Accounting · European Union Policy and Governance · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
Account-Holding Intensity
Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape
Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
Policy‐Maker of Last Resort? Drivers of Discretion at the European Central Bank
Legislative oversight of EU agencies through hearings
The European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism
The ECB as a banking supervisor
Police patrols, fire alarms, or ambulance chasers? Parliamentary oversight of European monetary policy and banking supervision
Two degrees versus two percent
What Do Politicians Think of Technocratic Institutions? Attitudes in the European Parliament Towards the European Central Bank
Understanding Accountability in Democratic Governance
Yellin’ at Yellen
Accountability in the EU's para‐regulatory state
Procedural vs substantive accountability in EMU governance
Reputational drivers and deterrents of accountability
What to Do with the ECB's Secondary Mandate
Q&A in legislative oversight
Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians
Analysing and Assessing Accountability
The ‘Banking Dialogue’ as a model to improve parliamentary involvement in the Monetary Dialogue
Integration without transparency’? Reliance on the space to think in the European Council and Council
The European Central Bank
The politics of the European Central Bank
The ECB's Monetary Dialogue with the European Parliament
Political Claims Analysis
Does Banking Union Worsen theEU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency
Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
The Interaction Order
| Obras citantes distintas | 17 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3,4 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 17 |