Henry Sidgwick’s Moral Epistemology
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8077944 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Anthony Skelton (0000-0003-0052-7243, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2010 |
| Volumen | 48 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 491-519 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2010-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of the history of philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-5053 • E-ISSN: 1538-4586 |
| Editorial | Project MUSE (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1353/hph.2010.0002 |
| OpenAlex | W2057173040 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 6 |
| Referencias citadas | 1 |
In this essay I defend the view that Henry Sidgwick’s moral epistemology is a form of intuitionist foundationalism that grants common-sense morality no evidentiary role. In §1, I outline both the problematic of The Methods of Ethics and the main elements of its argument for utilitarianism. In §§2-4 I provide my interpretation of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. In §§5-8 I refute rival interpretations, including the Rawlsian view that Sidgwick endorses some version of reflective equilibrium and the view that he is committed to some kind of pluralistic epistemology. In§9 I contend with some remaining objections to my view
Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Foundationalism · Interpretation (philosophy · Intuitionism · Morality · Reflective equilibrium · Utilitarianism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophy
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,5 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2014 - 2023 (10) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 6 |