Moral Realism without Convergence
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8086642 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Sarah Mcgrath (0009-0007-7901-4040, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2010 |
| Volumen | 38 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 59-90 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2010-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Philosophical Topics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0276-2080 • E-ISSN: 2154-154X |
| Editorial | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/philtopics201038214 |
| OpenAlex | W1983216660 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 9 |
| Referencias citadas | 11 |
It is sometimes claimed that if moral realism is true, then rational and informed individuals would not disagree about morality. According to this line of thought, the moral realist is committed to an extremely substantive convergence thesis, one that might very well turn out to be false. Although this idea has been accepted by prominent moral realists as well as by antirealists, I argue that we have no reason to think that it is true, and that the only convergence claims to which the realist is committed are trivial ones
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Convergence (economics · Economics · Epistemology · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Realism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophy
Magistrates, Mobs, and Moral Disagreement
Normative principles and the nature of mind-dependence
Ethics and epistemic hopelessness
Moral Realism and Expert Disagreement
The Right Argument from Moral Disagreement
Moral Vagueness and Epistemicism
Anti-luminosity and anti-realism in metaethics
Kantian Dignity and its Difficulties
The epistemology of moral disagreement
| Obras citantes distintas | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2017 - 2024 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 9 |