Reductionist Moral Realism and the Contingency of Moral Evolution
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8089712 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Max Barkhausen (autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2016 |
| Volumen | 126 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 662-689 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2016-03-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X |
| Editorial | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/684708 |
| OpenAlex | W2317188408 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 8 |
| Referencias citadas | 19 |
Reductionist forms of moral realism, such as naturalist realism, are often thought immune to epistemological objections that have been raised against nonnaturalist realism in the form of reliability worries or evolutionary debunking arguments. This article establishes that reductionist realist views can only explain the reliability of our moral beliefs at the cost of incurring repugnant first-order conclusions
Contingency · Critical realism (philosophy of perception · Economics · Epistemology · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Naturalism · Order (exchange · Philosophical realism · Realism · Reductionism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Philosophy
Why Metaethics Needs Empirical Moral Psychology
No need to get up from the armchair (if you’re interested in debunking arguments in metaethics)
Moral realism, disagreement, and conceptual ethics
Naturalizing Moral Naturalism
Evolution and Moral Disagreement
Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity
Third factor explanations and disagreement in metaethics
Modal Security
The Scientific Image
The Ethical Project
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Mathematical Truth
The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism
Social Dynamics
Beyond Individual Choice
Primates and Philosophers
You Just Believe That Because...1
The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic
Functions
Wright on Functions
Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
Geach on `Good
| Obras citantes distintas | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2018 - 2024 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 8 |