Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8092095
AutoresRichard Rowland (0000-0002-0471-1948, Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford, autor de correspondencia), Rach Cosker‐rowland (Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford)
Año2015
Volumen97
Número2
Páginas200-227
Fecha de publicación2015-01-20
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/papq.12057
OpenAlexW1860855342
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas32

Our concepts of good simpliciter , good for , and good as a particular kind of thing must share some common element. I argue that all three types of goodness can be analysed in terms of the reasons that there are for a certain sets of agents to have pro‐attitudes. To this end I provide new and compelling accounts of good for and goodness of a kind in terms of reasons for pro‐attitudes that are more explanatorily illuminating than competing accounts and that evade the objections that undermine previous accounts of good for and goodness of a kind in terms of reasons

Element (criminal law · Epistemology · Form of the Good · Goodness of fit · Political science · Sociology · Statistics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Law · Philosophy