Justice, Non-Human Animals, and the Methodology of Political Philosophy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8092402
AutoresDudley Plunkett (0000-0003-1293-5770, autor de correspondencia), David Plunkett
Año2016
Volumen7
Número1
Páginas1-29
Fecha de publicación2016-01-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJurisprudence (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2040-3313 • E-ISSN: 2040-3321
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/20403313.2015.1128202
OpenAlexW2308593364
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9

One important trend in political philosophy is to hold that non-human animals don't directly place demands of justice on us. Another important trend is to give considerations of justice normative priority in our general normative theorising about social/political institutions. This situation is problematic, given the actual ethical standing of non-human animals. Either we need a theory of justice that gives facts about non-human animals a non-derivative explanatory role in the determination of facts about what justice involves, or else we should be wary of the default normative priority that considerations of justice have in much of contemporary political philosophy. This discussion brings out important general methodological points tied to the role of concept and word choice in normative theorising about our social/political institutions. These methodological points, I argue, matter for a range of discussions in contemporary political philosophy, including those about global justice

Economic Justice · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Global justice · Normative · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Social science · Sociology · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Law · Philosophy