The sentience argument for experientialism about welfare

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8092488
AutoresWillem Van Der Deijl (0000-0002-8190-2705, autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen178
Número1
Páginas187-208
Fecha de publicación2020-02-12
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
EditorialSpringer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1007/s11098-020-01427-w
OpenAlexW3003431908
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas15
Referencias citadas43

Can a person’s degree of wellbeing be affected by things that do not enter her experience? Experientialists deny that it can, extra-experientialists affirm it. The debate between these two positions has focused on an argument against experientialism—the experience machine objection—but few arguments exist for it. I present an argument for experientialism. It builds on the claim that theories of wellbeing should not only state what constitutes wellbeing, but also which entities are welfare subjects. Moreover, the claims it makes about these two issues should have a certain coherence with each other. I argue that if we accept a particular plausible answer to the second question—namely that all and only sentient beings are welfare subjects—extra-experientialist theories face a problem of coherence. While this problem can typically be solved, doing so will involve steps that are unattractive. On experientialist theories, on the other hand, the answer to these questions cohere perfectly

Argument (complex analysis · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Political science · Sentience · Sociology · Welfare · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Law · Philosophy