How to Think About Virtue and Right

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8093450
AutoresValerie Tiberius (0000-0002-3048-1998, autor de correspondencia)
Año2006
Volumen35
Número2
Páginas247-265
Fecha de publicación2006-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Papers (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0556-8641 • E-ISSN: 1996-8523
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/05568640609485182
OpenAlexW2039515669
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas19
Referencias citadas2

Robert Johnson argues that virtue ethical accounts of right action fail because they cannot take account of the fact that there are things we ought to do precisely because we do not possess virtuous character traits. Self-improving actions are his paradigm case and it would indeed be a problem if virtue ethics could not make sense of the propriety of self-improvement. To solve this serious problem, I propose that virtue ethics ought to define right action in terms of the virtuous agent's reasons for action instead of defining right action in terms of the actions that the virtuous agent performs. I argue that this revised definition of right action makes sense of the Tightness of self-improving actions and that it can be given a genuinely virtue ethical interpretation

Action (physics · Character (mathematics · Epistemic virtue · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Sociology · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy