The Role of Magnitude in Kant's Critical Philosophy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8094541
AutoresDaniel Sutherland (0000-0002-3529-6943, autor de correspondencia)
Año2004
Volumen34
Número3
Páginas411-441
Fecha de publicación2004-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaCanadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1080/00455091.2004.10716573
OpenAlexW2470891890
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14
Referencias citadas17

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues for two principles that concern magnitudes. The first is the principle that ‘All intuitions are extensive magnitudes,’ which appears in the Axioms of Intuition (B202); the second is the principle that ‘In all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree,’ which appears in the Anticipations of Perception (B207). A circle drawn in geometry and the space occupied by an object such as a book are paradigm examples of extensive magnitudes, while the intensity of a light is a paradigm example of an intensive magnitude. These principles justify and explain the possibility of applying mathematics to objects of experience. The Axioms principle also explains the possibility of any mathematical cognition at all

Axiom · Critical philosophy · Epistemology · Geometry · Intuition · Linguistics · Object (grammar · Perception · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy