Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8096423
AutoresPaul Formosa (0000-0002-7490-0242, autor de correspondencia)
Año2011
Volumen21
Número2
Páginas170-196
Fecha de publicación2011-01-23
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00438.x
OpenAlexW1787353934
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas10
Referencias citadas41

The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant

Constructivism (international relations · Epistemology · Independence (probability theory · International relations · Interpretation (philosophy · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Moral reasoning · Political science · Politics · Realism · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification · Law · Philosophy