Passive Corruption
How Institutions Corrupt People
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8253324 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Colin Bird (0000-0002-9328-8175, University of Virginia, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2023 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 37-57 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2023-08-05 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Politica (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 2785-3330 • E-ISSN: 2785-4256 |
| Editorial | Firenze University Press (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.36253/rifp-2275 |
| OpenAlex | W4385632389 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 3 |
This paper questions the claim, advanced persuasively by Emanuela Ceva and Maria Paola Ferretti, that political corruption should primarily be understood as a “deficit of office accountability.” On the one hand, it identifies some ambiguities internal to their theory; these suggest that it underestimates the role of self-serving motives in corruption and overemphasizes the perversion of institutional mandates. On the other hand, it describes a form of “passive corruption” that their theory cannot easily accommodate. Passive corruption, I argue, consists in an excess, rather than a deficit, of “office accountability” and typically arises when different institutions come into conflict with each other
Accountability · Corrupt practices · Language change · Law and economics · Linguistics · Perversion · Political corruption · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Citas por año | 0,67 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Altamente citado | No |