Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8396155 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Matteo Colombo (0000-0002-2251-2248, Tilburg University, autor de correspondencia), Lee Elkin (0000-0002-8712-3729, Université Paris-Est Créteil, autor de correspondencia), Stephan Hartmann (0000-0001-8676-2177, Center for Integrated Protein Science Munich, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2021 |
| Volumen | 72 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 185-220 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2021-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axy059 |
| OpenAlex | W2786026501 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 18 |
| Referencias citadas | 77 |
Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this article, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research programme in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind.
Bayes' theorem · Bayesian inference · Bayesian probability · Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Naturalism · Philosophy of science · Praise · Scientific theory · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
Bayes, predictive processing, and the cognitive architecture of motor control
Why Perceptual Experiences cannot be Probabilistic
A free energy reconstruction of arguments for panpsychism
Approximating Bayes? On the role of approximations in Bayesian cognitive science
Structural Realism About the Free Energy Principle, the Best of Both Worlds
Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem
Don't trust Fodor's guide in Monte Carlo
Same but Different
Predictive processing's flirt with transcendental idealism
A tale of two architectures
When Rituals Fail
Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)
An instrumentalist take on the models of the Free-Energy Principle
Motivation, counterfactual predictions and constraints
Can Bayesian Models of Cognition Show That We Are (Epistemically) Rational
The Ambiguity Dilemma for Imprecise Bayesians
Seeing thought in the future
Predictive coding I
The Laws of Belief
Surfing Uncertainty
Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities
Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
The free-energy principle
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning
On Indeterminate Probabilities
How to Grow a Mind
Updating Subjective Probability
Computational rationality
Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition
Support theory
The Bayesian brain
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
Quantum probability theory
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe
Predictive brains and embodied, enactive cognition
An Overview of Possibilistic Handling of Default Reasoning, with Experimental Studies
Fuzzy logic and approximate reasoning
Bayesian reverse-engineering considered as a research strategy for cognitive science
Predictive coding and representationalism
Walter the banker
Is that what Bayesians believe? Reply to Griffiths, Chater, Norris, and Pouget (2012)
Bayes, Bounds, and Rational Analysis
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II
Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief
For a Few Neurons More
Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification, and Explanation
Bayes in the Brain—On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience
From tools to theories
Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience
How the Bayesians got their beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are)
| Obras citantes distintas | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3,6 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 17 |