Dynamic Humeanism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8398656
AutoresMichael Townsen Hicks (0000-0002-1304-5668, University of Oxford, autor de correspondencia)
Año2018
Volumen69
Número4
Páginas983-1007
Fecha de publicación2018-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axx006
OpenAlexW4234544711
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas30
Referencias citadas33

Humean accounts of laws of nature fail to distinguish between dynamic laws and static initial conditions. But this distinction plays a central role in scientific theorizing and explanation. I motivate the claim that this distinction should matter for the Humean, and show that current views lack the resources to explain it. I then develop a regularity theory that captures this distinction. My view takes empirical accessibility to be one of the primary features of laws, and I identify features laws must have to be empirically accessible. I then argue that laws with these features tend to be dynamic. 1 The Best System 1.1 Orthodox Humeanism2 The Best Is Not Good Enough 2.1 Laws and boundary conditions 2.2 Laws and scientific practice 2.3 An illustrative example3 Laws and Epistemic Roles 3.1 The epistemic criterion 3.2 The epistemic role account 3.3 Scientific virtues 3.4 Applying the epistemic role account4 Conclusion

Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Political science · Scientific law · Scientific theory · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science